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THE CASE OF THE BROKER'S COMMISSION *
MAURICE FINKELSTEIN t

A RECENT case in which the Court of Appeals was unable to

muster a majority for either side 1 brings to the foreground again the difficult problems involved in determining
at what precise point a broker has earned his commission.
Here the path of the law shows divergent trends between law
in books and law in action. With a simple facility, both law
teachers and text writers have frequently stated the general
rules.2 But the application of these rules to practical
situations as they arise seems to raise some undreamed of
difficulties.
If a broker is employed to secure a purchaser for real
or personal property under an agreement which does not
make his fee contingent on consummation of the sale, and he
procures such a purchaser who is, as the courts say, ready,
willing and able to purchase the property on the terms specified in the brokerage agreement, the stipulated commission
has been earned. 3 If no amount of commission is stipulated,
then the custom of the particular trade governs,4 or at worst,
* This is the second of a projected series of case studies designed to analyze
case histories from the viewpoint of factual structure. The effort is to study
in detail the progress of the litigation through the courts. The first of these
studies was published in this Review sub noinine The Case of the Beverly
Hotel-A Study of the Judicial Process, 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 261 (1953).
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 Wiesenberger v. Mayers, 281 App. Div. 171, 117 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1st
Dep't 1952), affirming by a divided court a decision by Justice Henry Clay
Greenberg, granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denying
plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed, and
the case was argued before the Court of Appeals on May 19, 1953. Inasmuch
as the Court split 3-3, the plaintiff moved to withdraw the appeal and the
motion was granted. 306 N.Y. 732, 117 N.E.2d 910 (1954).
2 See, e.g., simple statement of the rule in 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACMS § 1030A
(Rev. ed. 1936).
3 REsATEENT, AGENCy § 445, comments c and d (1933).
4 Freas B. Snyder & Co. v. Media-69th St. Mortgage Pool, 32 Del. Co. 36
(Pa. C.P. 1943); see Ingalls v. Streeter, 67 N.Y.S.2d 351, 354 (Syracuse
Munic. Ct. 1946).
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the broker will be entitled to recover in quantum meruit.5
Such situations furnish a minimum of difficulty. The factual
question is limited to a determination of whether in truth
the proposed purchaser ever offered to purchase the property
at the price stipulated in the brokerage agreement, and at a
time when he was ready and able to do so; and the legal
question is confined largely to the relevance of the Statute of
Frauds; for, in some states, real estate brokerage agreements
are void unless in writing and signed by the vendor,6 or the
7
person to be charged.
In these simple cases it does not matter that the contract
of sale was never entered into,8 or that its enforcement was

barred by the Statute of Frauds,9 or that either of the parties
refused to consummate the deal. 10 The broker has earned his
commission when, and as soon as, he has complied with the
brokerage contract by producing a purchaser ready, able and

willing to buy on the terms stipulated in the brokerage
contract.
5 See note 4 supns; see also Bierman v. Barbieri, 124 Misc. 157, 158, 207
N.Y.6 Supp. 174, 175 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1924).
IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 9-508 (1947); IND. STAT. ANN. § 33-104 (Burns,
1933); NEa. REv. STAT.

(1940).
7

§ 36-107

(1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 25:1-9

A~iz. CoDE ANN. § 58-101(7) (1939) ; CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1624(5) (Deering, 1949); MicH. ComP. LAws §566.132(5) (1948); MONT. REV. CODES
§ 13-606(6) (1947); N.Y. PEaS. Paop. LAw § 31(10); Oa. FEv. STAT. c. 41,
§41.580(7) (1953); Tax. STAT. art. 3995a (Vernon, 1948) (mineral lands
only); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 25, §25-5-4(5) (1953); WASH. REv. CODE tit. 19,
§19.36.010(5) (1951); WIS. STAT. §240.10 (1951) (party agreeing to pay
such compensation). See also CANAL ZONE CODE tit. 3, §886(5) (1934);
HAW I REV. LAWS tit. 22, § 8721(6) (1945); ALBERTA REv. STAT. Div. 18,
c. 319, §2 (1942); ONTAIUo REV. STAT. c. 332, §39(a) (1950).
A similar
statute in Ohio [OHIO GEa. ConE ANN. §8621 (1921)] was repealed in 1931
by 114 Laws of Ohio 110. For exceptions to the New York statute, see note
11 infra.
8 "It is a well-settled rule that when a broker finds a purchaser ready,
willing, and able to meet the owner's terms, the broker may recover his commission even though the employer refuses to transact business with the person
in question. 4 R.C.L. 309." See Note, 51 A.L.R. 1390 (1927). See also Note,
36 HARv. L. REv. 875 (1923).
"That the requirement-of the Statute of Frauds, that the agreement must
be evidenced in writing, might be pleaded in defense, has no bearing upon the
question of whether the plaintiffs had earned their commissions." Tanenbaum
v. Boehm, 202 N.Y. 293, 299, 95 N.E. 708, 710 (1911). See also Rosenblatt
v. Bergen, 237 N.Y. 88, 142 N.E. 361 (1923).
10 Charles v. Cook, 88 App. Div. 81, 84 N.Y. Supp. 867 (2d Dep't 1903);
Brown v. Helmuth, 2 Misc. 566, 21 N.Y. Supp. 615 (Super. Ct. 1892); Bach
v. Emerich, 3 Jones & S. 548 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1873); Heinrich v. Korn,
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At least in New York, with some exceptions, brokerage
agreements are required by the statute to be in writing.11
The advisability of such a requirement from the point of view
of natural justice is obvious. Often the terms of sale are
complex. The rate of commission frequently departs from
the customary. Oral testimony and human recollection are
but feeble props in such circumstances. Nor is the application of the statute an insurmountable obstacle where good
conscience requires other results. There-still remain the twin
judicial inroads on the Statute of Frauds: the doctrine of
part performance, and the rule with respect to fiduciary
12
relations.
Such cases are law office chores and do not press for nice
legal discernment. Of an altogether different vintage are
cases where the broker's claim to have earned a commission
is based on the theory that a buyer and seller have come together on a deal, different from that specified in the brokerage
agreement, or absent specified terms in the brokerage agreement. Here, if for some reason the deal fails of consummation, difficult questions of law and fact are presented in seeking an answer to the question: has the broker earned his
commission?
4 Daly 74 (N.Y.C.P. 1871); Roche v. Smith, 176 Mass. 595, 58 N.E. 152
(1900); Scully v. Williamson, 26 Okla. 19, 108 Pac. 395 (1910).
11 N.Y. PEns. PROP. LAW § 31(10), as added by Laws of N.Y. 1949, c. 203
(effective Sept. 1, 1949). The statute specifically excludes contracts to pay
brokerage commissions to an attorney or duly licensed real estate broker. For
all practical purposes, the exception removes from the purview of the Statute
of Frauds all real estate brokerage agreements, since under Sections 440-a,
442-d, 442-e, and 442-f of the Real Property Law, a real estate broker other
than an attorney or officer of the court must be licensed, licensing being a
prerequisite to an action for commissions, and violation thereof constituting a
misdemeanor. The section will be applicable to non-licensed real estate brokers
only in the situation where a contract is made within the state to render services without the state. See 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 65(G), RomRT, N.Y. LAW
Ravisiox CoMmissIoN 617 (1949).
12 But see opinion of Rabin, J., in Goldberg v. Shlingbaum, 112 N.Y.S2d 8
(Sup. Ct. 1951), holding that part performance under N.Y. PERs. PRoP. LAW
§ 31(10) means . . . complete performance including pay"Wnt." 112 N.Y.S.2d

at 9. The learned justice relied on Tyler v. Windels, 186 App. Div. 698, 174
N.Y. Supp. 762 (1st Dep't), affd mer., 227 N.Y. 589, 125 N.E. 926 (1919),
and Smith v. Graham, 277 App. Div. 1116, 101 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1st Dep't 1950)
(both cases dealing with subdivision 1 of Section 31, but seemingly applicable
to subdivision 10 of that section). See also New York annotations to REsTATEMENT, CONunACrS § 198 (1932), although the text of Section 198 would imply
a contrary rule elsewhere than in New York.
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As indicated above, the legal principles involved can be
easily stated. If all or substantially all the terms of the
agreement between the buyer and the seller have been determined and assented to by them, and merely formalities remain
for the consummation of the transaction-formalities such as
the fixing of a date for closing, or the reduction of the agreement to writing, 3 or other comparatively immaterial details
-the broker has earned his commission. The enigma is in
the word "formalities." Whether a particular provision of
the agreement is so vital to the entire transaction that the
failure to resolve it renders the agreement between the buyer
and seller incomplete, is the precise problem. But there is
still another problem, and that arises even where the essential elements of the agreement exist. They must not only
exist, but co-exist, at the same moment of time. If A says to
B, "I am willing to sell you my black horse for $100," and B
says to A, "I will let you know what I decide about it tomorrow," or, "I will surely buy it if my uncle will lend me
the money," or, "It is a deal if my wife does not object," and
A says, "Very well," meaning, "I agree," is there a meeting
of the minds which entitles the broker to commission if by
tomorrow B produces the 100, or his wife's assent, and is
ready, willing and able to proceed only to discover that by
then A has already changed his mind?
Prophylactic law would certainly avoid this and similar
problems, but brokerage contracts are infrequently drawn by
lawyers, and laymen's language is geared to the imaginative.
The hunt is, therefore, one for the "intent of the parties.'
Thus, even where the brokerage agreement provides that the
commission is not earned unless "title is closed," or "contract
is performed," or "deal is consummated," or "if the deal fails
13 Perhaps as good a statement of the rule as can be found was made by

Hunt, J., in Barnard v. Monnot, 3 Keyes 203, 204, 33 How. Prac. 440, 441
(N.Y. 1866): "The duty of the broker consisted in bringing the minds of
the vendor and the vendee to an agreement. He could do no more. He had
no power to execute a contract, to pay the money for the one side, to convey
the land on the part of the other, or to compel the performance by either of
their duties. The plaintiff produced a purchaser, willing and ready to accept
the terms of the defendant, and able to perform the obligation on his part.
He had then earned his commissions, and it would be a singular conclusion of
the law that the refusal of his employer to complete the bargain, should destroy
his right to them."
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for any reason to go through," the seller may still have to
pay the commission though the transaction is not closed.
This might occur where the seller repudiates or is unable to
perform; certainly where the seller's retirement from the
transaction is culpable or arbitrary. Language more specific
is required to enable the seller arbitrarily to avoid both the
14
sale agreement and the commission.
It is a nice problem to determine whether a seller, having
once acquiesced, may withdraw from a transaction and still
be immune to the claim for commission, shielded by the
umbrella of laymen's phrases that "no commission is payable unless deal is closed." 15
The suggestion here made is that the unity of time, as
one says in property law, is all important. If the vendor's
agreement to accept the proffered terms is coincident in time
with the buyer's readiness, willingness and ability to buy,
the broker has earned his pay. It will not in that case matter if the seller declines to bind himself with legal chains to
the purchaser and, in fact, repudiates the transaction pursuant to his legal right to do so.
In the recent case above adverted to in which the Court
of Appeals, with only six judges sitting, was unable to reach
a decision, prickly problems, not easily resolved, were raised.
As the case came up on cross motions for summary judgment
under the New York Rules of Civil Practice, 16 the factual
14 Language, e.g., such as used in Grenell Realty Agency, Inc. v. Gruner,
63 N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1946), where the vendor was exculpated

from any obligation to the broker if title failed to pass for any reason
...
including the fault of the vendor." Id. at 444.
15 The New York cases have gone furthest in protecting the broker in such
cases. Thus, in Magrill v. Langan, 43 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1943),
the broker had agreed that his commission should not be paid until delivery
of a deed, yet the broker prevailed though the transaction never was consummated, because seller's title was defective. The principal case is Colvin v.
Post Mortgage & Land Co., 225 N.Y. 510, 122 N.E. 454 (1919); see also
Smith v. Peyrot, 201 N.Y. 210, 94 N.E. 662 (1911); Knapp v. Wallace, 41
N.Y. 477 (1869); Cusack v. Aikman, 93 App. Div. 579, 87 N.Y. Supp. 940
(2d Dep't 1904); accord, Peters v. Dreger, 146 Neb. 670, 21 N.W.2d 436

(1946).

Contra: Guy L. Deano, Inc. v. Michel, 191 La. 233, 185 So. 9 (Sup.

Ct.), reversing 190 La. 7, 181 So. 551 (Ct. App. 1938).

16 See note 1 supra.
Summary judgment is permitted on application of
either party by Rule 113 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice. The

courts are authorized to grant such relief, before trial, where only questions
of law remain for decision, all questions of fact having been resolved.
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situation was not seriously in doubt. Of course, there were
conflicts in interpretation of the facts between the opposing
affidavits. But this was a situation in which written documents spoke for themselves and it was not necessary to resort
to interpretation of the facts by counsel for the respective
parties.
The story began in the summer of 1950, when two men,
brothers, who, with their respective wives, were the owners
of all the capital stock of a corporation, sought to sell the
securities for approximately two and one-half million dollars.
To this end they engaged the services of a broker, the plaintiff, and their arrangement was in writing as contained in a
letter addressed by the plaintiff to the two brothers and reading as follows: 17
May 25, 1950.
Messrs. L. and C. M
516 West 34th Street
New York City, N. Y.

s,

Dear Lawrence and Chauncey:
This will serve as the memorandum which you requested of
what we previously agreed upon orally regarding the sale of all of
the outstanding stock of L. and C. Mayers Co., Inc., which I understand is owned by your wives and yourselves.
As I explained, it takes time to negotiate a sale because first,
considerable preparatory work is required before a proper presentation can be made to a prospective buyer, and, second, it takes time
for a buyer to decide whether or not to buy. Accordingly, you now
give me the exclusive right until August 31, 1950, to sell the above
stock. The price is $2,500,000 for all the shares, payable in cash, or
upon such other terms as may be acceptable to you. For my efforts
in producing a purchaser by that date, you will pay me $100,000
upon completion of the transaction. Of course, if I do not obtain a
purchaser by that date, you will owe me nothing, regardless of my
efforts and expense-and it follows also that should I obtain a purchaser by that date, but the transaction should perchance close thereafter, my commission nonetheless will have been earned.
Because the deal is capable of being worked out in different ways,
our understanding is that I am to receive my commission no matter
'1 See Record on Appeal (App. Div.), Fols. 105, 246-249.
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what kind of assets you actually sell or in what form the transaction
is cast.
I believe this covers our understanding completely, and, if you
agree, kindly sign the enclosed copy of this letter and return it to me.
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed)
AW/ms
Agreed:
LM (signed) Lawrence M
CM (signed) Chauncey M

ARTHUR WIESENBERGER
s
s

Acting under the authority of this letter, the plaintiff
interested a purchaser in acquiring the property referred to
at a reduced price from that stipulated in the brokerage contract. Then followed the not unusual long and protracted
discussions participated in by the buyer and the seller and
the broker and the attorneys for the respective parties. Information was exchanged, proposals and counter proposals
were made and considered, and, finally, all the terms of the
proposed agreement were arrived at and incorporated in a
written instrument. Throughout these negotiations, it was
known to all the parties that the purchaser did not propose
to enter into the transaction unless he could borrow a substantial sum from local lending institutions. But it was not
doubted that he would be successful in making such a loan.
Nevertheless, the purchaser was unwilling to bind himself
legally until definitive word with respect to the loan could
be obtained from the lending institutions. But since the purchase and sale agreement had been whipped into shape, a
novel scheme was adopted to eliminate debate and discussion
when the loan should be consummated. To this end both the
sellers and the purchaser executed the purchase and sale
agreement, but the agreement was not delivered. It was, instead, placed in escrow with the attorney for the purchaser
under an escrow agreement which provided as follows: 1 8
1. That the purchaser and the seller had deposited with
the escrow holder the purchase and sale agreement executed
in three counterparts.
18 Id., Fols. 37-50.
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2. That the purchaser was engaged in negotiating a
loan and that when the escrow holder was advised by the
purchaser that the negotiations were successful, he was to so
inform the seller; thereupon the seller was to deliver the
stock to the escrow holder and the purchaser was to deliver
checks, constituting part payment, to the escrow agent.
3. Upon receipt of such checks and stock, the escrow
agent was to insert in the sale agreement a closing date to be
no later than one 'week after the receipt by the escrow agent
of the stock and the checks. And he was also to deliver one
of the counterparts of the agreement to the purchaser, and
two counterparts to the seller, together with the checks, and
the agreement was then to be considered "in full force and
effect for all purposes."
4. If the purchaser should fail to deliver the said checks
to the escrow agent within two days after notification of the
successful conclusion of the loan arrangements, or if the
sellers should fail within two days after such notification to
deliver the stock, then the escrow agreement was to be deemed
terminated and the escrow agent was to cut off the signatures
of the parties from the sale agreement and return one counterpart without said signatures to the purchaser, and two
counterparts without said signatures to the sellers, and the
sales agreement was to be deemed null and void.
5. The escrow agreement was to endure for only two
weeks, at the end of which time if either the purchaser had
not notified the escrowee of the successful completion of his
loan arrangements and delivered the checks, or the sellers
had failed to deliver the stock, the sales agreement was at an
end and the transaction was off.
Before the two weeks had expired, the sellers suffered
a change of heart and notified the escrow agent that they
were unwilling to proceed with the transaction regardless
of the outcome of the purchaser's loan arrangements. Thereafter, the purchaser completed his loan arrangements and so
notified the escrow agent within the two-week period and
tendered checks, but as the sellers refused to perform, the
escrow agent declared the agreement at an end, destroyed the
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signatures on the sales agreement and delivered one unsigned
counterpart to the purchaser, and two unsigned counterparts
to the sellers.
At this point the broker demanded and sued for his commission. The broker claimed that on this record he was entitled to his commission when the parties had come together
on the terms of the sale. He claimed also that the loan arrangements had been arrived at prior to the execution of the
sale agreement and awaited only formalities for their consummation. He asserted that the provisions of the escrow
agreement, which apparently permitted each of the parties to
withdraw regardless of the outcome of the loan arrangements, were entered into subsequently and without his knowledge. He did not contend that if the assent of the purchaser
had been expressly withheld as it appeared to be from the
escrow agreement, pending negotiations for the loan, that
his commission would have been earned. He claimed, however, that the assent of the purchaser was unconditional and
that the two-week delay provided for in the escrow agreement
was merely occasioned by the necessity of formalizing the
terms of the loan. He did not claim that the parties had
ever been bound to each other, the purchasers to purchase,
and the sellers to sell. Such a claim would have been inconsistent, to say the least, with the Statute of Frauds or with
the terms of the escrow agreement, but he did claim that
all the terms of the sale had been agreed upon and that the
seller arbitrarily withdrew from the transaction because of
a change of heart shielded by the escrow agreement of which
he, the broker, had no knowledge, and to which he was not
a party.
On this state of facts, Special Term granted summary
judgment to the defendants, and the Appellate Division affirmed by a divided court. In the Court of Appeals, with only
six judges sitting, briefs were filed and arguments were heard,
but no decision was reached; instead the court directed reargument before a court which included a seventh judge,
called in for the purpose. At this point, the parties determined to call off the litigation and the sellers agreed to pay
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one-half of the sum demanded by the broker, which the broker
accepted.
Both parties agreed on this complicated state of facts
that there was no point in requiring a trial. The sellers maintained that the broker had not earned his commission even
if he was ignorant of the terms of the escrow agreement because there was no period of time at which the purchaser
was ready, willing and able to purchase, since the agreement
to purchase was not merely conditioned upon his ability to
obtain a loan, but he was unwilling to bind himself in advance, even should the loan negotiations be successful. The
purchaser wanted to wait out the two weeks, conclude his
loan negotiations, and then say finally whether the purchase
and sale agreement should become binding. The sellers likewise maintained that while they had agreed upon all the
terms tentatively, they did not absolutely agree to accept
them, but postponed such an agreement for two weeks during
which they suffered a change of heart.
It will be obvious from the foregoing that the simple
statement of the rule is most difficult to apply to this state
of facts. The sale agreement was all but consummated and
the conceded two weeks' waiting period was reserved by the
parties to make a final determination. From the point of
view of the defendants in the case, it was as if they had said,
"If within the next two weeks we finally determine to sell,
these are the terms upon which we will sell"; and as if the
purchaser had said, "If within the next two weeks we finally
determine to buy, these are the terms upon which we will
buy."
Put thus, it is tolerably clear that there was no final
meeting of the minds since neither party had said, "We are
agreed on these terms and we need time merely for formalities." Here, as elsewhere in the law, there is an underlying
moral problem. The broker had been to much trouble to
arrange the terms of sale, to induce the purchaser to make
an offer, to persuade the sellers to accept the offer. Much
effort had been expended in working out the terms of the
purchase and sale agreement. All of the terms had been
finally worked out. But the sale requires something more
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than mere agreement upon its terms. It requires a willingness to act upon what the parties ultimately consider fair
terms. The right to refuse to sell even at a fair price is one
of the attributes of ownership. And the right to purchase
is a similar prerogative. On the record facts, it appears that
at one moment the sellers were willing to sell upon the agreed
terms, but were unwilling to so state, and the purchaser was
willing to purchase on those terms, but the purchaser was
inhibited from expressing his agreement by the inconclusive
nature of the loan arrangements. When the loan arrangements were concluded and the purchaser was willing to bind
himself, the sellers had already changed their minds and had
so notified the escrowee. There was thus lacking what we
call the unity of time, which apparently is an essential ingredient to enable a broker to claim that his commission has
been earned. 19
Viewed closely, there would appear to have been an
issue of fact in the case even though both parties denied it.
'19 Chief Judge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals, while yet a
justice of the Supreme Court of New York (a nisi prius court), sitting in an
Appellate Term, had occasion to deal specifically with a strikingly similar problem in Bender v. Wasser, 193 N.Y. Supp. 528 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1923). There,
defendant orally agreed to sell a garage to a purchaser found by plaintiff for
$13,500. When the parties met to execute the contract of sale at the lawyer's
office, it appeared that the purchaser could not enter into the agreement until
he obtained a release from a covenant he had made not to operate a garage in
the neighborhood. He asked for a postponement for the purpose of securing
the release. When he procured the release, the vendor refused to sell. Judge
Lehman, in deciding against the broker, said: "[Plaintiffs] . . . were not entitled to any commission until they procured a purchaser ready, able, and willing to make an agreement to buy the business on terms acceptable to the
defendants. While it may be that the proposed customer procured by the
plaintiff did come to an apparent understanding with the defendants at their
first meeting, and that the plaintiffs, as brokers, would have been entitled to
their commission, if the customer had been ready, able, and willing to enter
into a written contract in accordance with that understanding, yet clearly, since
the customer was not able or willing to make any binding agreement with the
defendants at that tine, the plaintiffs had not fulfilled the terms of their employment. The postponement claimed to have been granted by the defendants
until a consent was obtained by the customer was not a mere postponement
of the time set for putting in writing an oral agreement, for the customer was
not obligated to obtain a consent, and there was therefore no complete oral
agreement in existence. Until the customer did agree, orally or in writing,
to buy the business, the defendants had a right to change their minds as to
the terms on which they would sell, and, until the plaintiffs had brought the
minds of both parties together upon the terms of an agreement of purchase
and sale, they were not entitled to any compensation." Id. at 529-530 (emphasis
added).
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The plaintiff asserted that he did not know that in the escrow
agreement the parties had withheld final consent to the
transaction on the terms agreed upon. He thought that the
delay of two weeks was occasioned by formal requirements
and if this were indeed the fact, the broker should have prevailed. The sellers, on the other hand, pointed to the reality
that the parties had never agreed to sell on the terms set
forth in the undelivered sales agreement and pointed to the
escrow agreement as conclusive proof of this fact. Even if
the escrow agreement had, indeed, been entered into without
the knowledge of the broker, that is, even if he had not been
aware of the fact that no agreement to buy and sell had actually been reached, he, of course, would not be entitled to his
brokerage commission since the spirit of the brokerage
agreement, if not the very letter, was that there was to be
no brokerage fee unless the transaction was closed. Until
that moment, the seller, of course, was free to withdraw from
the sale on any terms which were less than those stipulated
in the brokerage agreement, as were the terms in question.
The Appellate Division casts some light upon this problem.
The majority said,20 "Recovery is sought upon the basis that
defendants said 'yes' to the offer that was presented at less
than the original terms, but then said 'no' before a sale had
been made or incorporated into an executory contract.
Assuming, without deciding, that such facts alone would be
sufficient in law to support a recovery, additional facts uphold the dismissal of the complaint by Special Term." It is
thus suggested that where a broker procures an offer which
is accepted by a seller but rejected before it becomes binding
in law, the broker has earned his commission, or at least it
is to be assumed arguendo that he may have earned his
commission.
We had thought that this rule was well settled. All
that a broker need prove is that there has been a meeting of
the minds between buyer and seller. If the seller said "yes"
to an offer, at a moment when the offeror was ready, able and
willing to buy, even though a technical contract of sale
20

Wiesenberger v. Mayers, 281 App. Div. 171, 174, 117 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559
(1st Dep't 1952).
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(offer, acceptance, consideration) was
never entered into, the
2
broker is entitled to his commission.
But this rule was not applied by the majority to this case
because there was not in fact an unequivocal "yes" by the
sellers at a moment of time when the purchaser was ready,
able and willing to purchase. The essential failure of the
broker was predicated upon his inability to prove that the
purchaser had at any time before the seller withdrew evinced
a willingness to be bound to buy. For a purchaser to say
that he is willing to buy and then to recede from the arrangement and to contract for leave to withdraw, said the majority of the Appellate Division, is not enough for the broker's
22
purposes.
It is not enough that the buyer says that he wants to buy, if he later
says that he does not know whether he wishes to buy or not, and
contracts for leave to withdraw, and no sale is ever executed. That
is a different type of condition from the happening of some external
event, beyond the parties' control.
The minority of the Appellate Division construed the
documents as giving the purchaser an option to purchase
upon agreed terms. When the sellers receded from the transaction before the expiration of the time within which the purchaser could exercise his option already granted him, the
23
broker had earned his commission.
Lawyers who spend much of their time in participating
in contract negotiations are not unfamiliar with the disappointments inherent in the failure of transactions to come to
a conclusion after all of the thorny problems have apparently
been ironed out. Frequently much labor is wasted and deferred hopes are painfully frustrated when at the last moment
an impediment to the transaction destroys it. Where earnings depend on the conclusion of transactions, it would seem,
of course, to be natural justice to deny compensation to any21 See note 13 supra. See also Stern v. Gepo Realty Corp., 289 N.Y. 274,
45 N.E.2d 440 (1942), and Mengel v. Lawrence, 276 App. Div. 180, 93 N.Y.S.2d
443 (1st Dep't 1949), both cited by the majority in Wiesenberger v. Mayers,
supra note 20 at 176, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
22 Wiesenberger v. Mayers, snpra note 20 at 177, 117 N.Y.S2d at 562.
23 Id. at 182, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
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one who has labored on the contingency of successful fruition.
The significant element of this case is the fact that the transaction never came into being. The purchasers' hopes were
frustrated and the broker did not get his commission. But so
uncertain is the path of the law that no one can say with
finality at what point in such a transaction the broker's commission, under the law, has been earned. Natural justice,
which requires that commitments be kept, also requires that
where there are no commitments, there should be no compulsion to perform. It is not unnatural that the Court of
Appeals was divided in such a case, but it does leave the state
of the law extremely uncertain, an uncertainty to be sure
which would hardly have been resolved had there been a
four-to-three decision on either side.

